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CIVIL AUTHORITY VERSUS MILITARY
THE constitution of each state in the Union, except New
York, provides for the subordination of the military to the civil
power.' Two state constitutions provide that the military shall
be subordinate to and governed by the civil power. 2 Five com-
monwealths have constitutions providing that the military ought
to be under strict subordination to and control of the civil power.3
The exact significance of these constitutional provisions is a sub-
ject of controversy.
An excellent example of the issues involved is found in the
case of State v. Brown.4 The constitution of West Virginia states
that "no citizen, unless engaged in the military service of the
state, shall be tried or punished by any military court, for any
offence cognizable by the civil courts of the state." 5 Neverthe-
less this provision of the constitution did not prevent the declara-
tion of martial law by the executive and legislative departments
of the state government. This action virtually suspended the
constitution. A governor became dictator. He decided the dura-
tion and extent of his authority. The military became the in-
strument to enforce his will. The danger is self-evident. Citi-
zens were placed at the mercy of the military authorities during
the period of an emergency, the existence of which was not the
subject of judicial determination.
The United States war department has published the syllabi
of the opinion in the West Virginia case "for the information of
the service in general," as follows :6
"The governor of this state has power to declare a state of
war in any town, city, district, or county of the state, in the event
of an invasion thereof by a hostile military force or an insurrec-
I Columbia Digest; Index Digest of State Constitutions, p. 980; Stim-
son, Federal and State Constitutions Sec. 292.
2 Massachusetts, Pt. I, 17; South Carolina, I, 26.
3 Maryland, Deci. R., 30; New Hampshire, I, 26; North Carolina,
I, 24; Vermont, I, 16; Virginia, I, 13.
4 State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, (1912) 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S. E. 243, 45
L. R. A. (N.S.) 996.
5 West Virginia, III, 12.6 Dig. of Ops. of Judge Adv. Gen., etc., July 1, 1912, to April 1, 1917,
pp. 208, 209.
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tion, rebellion, or riot therein, and in such case, to place such
town, city, district or county under martial law.
"The constitutional guaranties of the subordination of the
military to the civil power, . .. are to be read and inter-
preted so as to harmonize with other provisions of the Constitu-
tion, authorizing the maintenance of a military organization,"
[and the presumption against] "intent on the part of the people,
in the formulation and adoption of the constitution, to abolish a
generally recognized incident of sovereignty, the power of self
preservation.
This view, that martial law is "a generally recognized incident
of sovereignty," is of great interest when compared with the ex-
press provisions of several of the state constitutions forbidding or
limiting the scope of martial law. Thus the Tennessee constitu-
tion provides that:
"Martial law, in the sense of the unrestricted power of mili-
tary officers . . . is inconsistent with the principles of free
government, and is not confided to any department of the gov-
ernment of this state."
It is true that the Tennessee constitution also states that no
citizen is subject to martial law except those in "the army of the
United States, or militia in actual service."
7
The constitutions of Massachusetts and New Hampshire pro-
vide that the government may use and exercise "martial law in
time of war or invasion, and also in time of rebellion, declared by
the Legislature to exist."8
Three states expressly recognize the extension of martial law
to civilians, by legislative approval of the executive declaration;.
but only members of the naval force and militia in active service
are punishable under martial law except by the consent of the leg-
islature.9 Most of the state constitutions make no reference to
martial law. Rhode Island appears to recognize the true situation
with the statement: "The lw martial shall be used and exercised
in such cases only as occasion shall necessarily require."' 1
What is the significance of the few constitutional references
to martial law? Was it confused by the framers of the state con-
stitutions with military law? Or was it tacitly recognized that a
7 Tennessee, I, 25. See also, Vermont, I, 17; Maryland, Decl. R_, 32.
8.Massachusetts, Pt. II Chap. 11 Sec. 1, 7; New Hampshire, II, 50.
9 Massachusetts, Pt. I, 28; New Hampshire, I, 34; South Carolina,
I, 27.10 Rhode Island Const., Art. I, 18.
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sovereign state has the right of self defense? Certainly the dis-
tinction between martial and military law is of great importance
and fundamental in the consideration of this constitutional ques-
tion.
Martial law as a domestic fact presupposes a condition in
which the civil courts are unable to enforce their processes and
is justified by the necessity of society protecting itself during an
emergency period until the civil courts may again resume their
proper functions. It is "the suspension of all law but the will of
the military commanders entrusted with its execution, to be exer-
cised according to their judgment, the exigencies of the moment,
and the usages of the service, with no fixed or settled rules or
laws, no definite practice, and not bound even by the rules of the
military law."" "When martial law prevails the civil power is
superseded by the military power, and the ordinary safeguards
to individual rights are for the time being set aside, but it is in-
cumbent on those who administer it to art in accordance with
the principles of justice, honor, and humanity and the laws and
usages of war. ' 1
2
Military law must be carefully distinguished from martial
law, which applies to civilian persons not ordinarily subject to
military authority. Martial law may exist under a military gov-
ernment, established in hostile or occupied territory.13 It may
also exist as a domestic fact within the boundaries of the United
States. Military law ordinarily applies to military persons only
(with exceptions as to retainers to the camp, spies, etc.), and is
applicable in time of peace as well as in time of war. Martial
law is temporary in character. It exists only to combat an emer-
gency condition. It applies to all persons and things within the
area under control, and during such emergency period the will
of the commander is supreme, except in so far as international
law may restrain his conduct in hostile or occupied territory. It
was used in the Revolutionary War by Washington at Valley
Forge. It was declared by General Jackson at New Orleans.
Martial law existed in Rhode Island in 1842.1" During the Civil
War the President, under legislative authority, repeatedly de-
"Pomeroy, Constitutional Law Sec. 712.12 Dig. of Ops. of judge Adv. Gen., 1912, p. 1079.
13 Moore, International Law Dig., VII, Sec. 1147.14 Luther v. Borden, (1848) 7 How. (U. S.) 1, 12 L. Ed. 581.
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clared martial law to exist in enemy territory.15  During the past
five years martial law has been actually declared in six states of
the Union.' 6 A condition of quasi-martial law has also been de-
clared in other instances; as in Minnesota, October, 1918, when
the militia was called out to maintain order and do relief work
necessitated by a great forest fire.
When courts have been destroyed or made incompetent to
act, does the military in its own right take the place of the author-
ity that has disappeared and for the period of the emergency
supersede the civil authority? There can be no doubt concern-
ing the possibility of martial law in the United States. The four
dissenting judges in Ex parte Milligan held that "it is within the
power of congress to determine in what state or districts such
great and imminent public danger exists as justifies the authoriza-
tion of military tribunals for the trial of crimes and offenses"
against public safety. This means that it is possible to place civi-
lians on trial before military tribunals although they are not mem-
bers of the "land or naval forces" and have not been held to an-
swer "on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury."'1 7  Even
the Kentucky court, which has limited the authority of the mili-
tary most closely in the United States, says: "We have not in
mind a state of case in which actual war . . exists . . Is
Yet Willoughby writes: "There is then strictly speaking no
such thing in American law as a declaration of martial law where-
by the military is substituted for civil law."'19 Nevertheless a
number of states have legislated to protect the soldier from both
civil and criminal liability for his acts when in active military
15 Ford v. Surget, (1878) 97 U. S. 594, 24 L. Ed. 1018.
16 Colorado, Georgia, Montana, Ohio, Texas, West Virginia.
17 Const., Fifth Amendment. Is the provision in the fifth amendment
surplusage in so far as it excepts "cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war or public
danger"? All court-martial proceedings, of course, deny the accused a
jury trial as provided for in the sixth amendment. It would appear more
logical to consider court-martial proceedings as a part of the military
powers of the executive department, non-judicial in character, and hence
the accused has no constitutional right to the protections guaranteed in
the case of judicial criminal proceedings. If this is true, why make the
exception referred to in the fifth amendment?
18 Franks v. Smith, (1911) 142 Ky. 232, 134 S. W. 484, L. R. A. 1915A
1141, 1163.
19 Willoughby, Const. Law, II, Sec. 727.
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service pursuant to duty.20 These statutes apply to a case aris-
ing either under martial law or military law. A typical statute is
the existing Minnesota law:
"The commanding officer of any militia force engaged in the
suppression of an insurrection, the dispersion of a mob, or the
enforcement of the laws shall exercise his discretion as to the
propriety of firing upon or otherwise attacking any mob or other
unlawful assembly; and, if he exercise his honest judgment there-
on, he shall not be liable in either a civil or a criminal action for
any act done while on such duty. But no officer, under any pre-
tense or in compliance with any order, shall direct or permit his
men, or any of them, to fire blank cartridges upon any mob or
unlawful assemblage, under penalty of dishonorable dismissal
from the service. No officer or enlisted man shall be held liable,
in either a civil or a criminal action, for any act done under law-
ful orders and in the performance of his duty.
' '21
But it may be seriously questioned whether such a statute does
not attempt to deprive a citizen of his property without due proc-
ess of law so far as the tort action for damages is concerned.
22
Under a statute similar to the Minnesota section quoted it would
be impossible successfully to prosecute a military officer or sol-
dier in a civil court for an alleged crime committed in the hon-
est and faithful performance of duty. It is thus evident that
the military is not at all times subordinate to the civil authority.
Although the tort action may be successfully maintained, as held
in the Louisiana case cited, at least so far as superior officers are
concerned, yet the possibility of a civil action could hardly re-
strain financially irresponsible members of a military organization
who are practically immune from punishment so long as mili-
tary orders are obeyed.
The possible relation between the military authority and the
civil courts is well illustrated in the letter of Chief Justice Chase
to President Johnson, October 12, 1865.23 The Southern states
were under martial law in a part of the Chief Justice's circuit and
for that reason he wrote to the executive objecting to the holding
of the circuit court: "A civil court in a district under martial
20 Consol. Laws N. Y., p. 2339, military code, Sec. 14. Revised Laws
of Hawaii, 1915, Sec. 208: "Members of the militia ordered into active
service of the Territory by any proper authority shall not be liable, civilly
or criminally, for any act or acts done by them in pursuance of duty in
such service."
21 G. S. 1913, Sec. 2379.
22 0'Shee v. Stafford, (1908) 122 La. 444, 47 So. 764, 16 Ann. Cas. 1163.
23 In re Davis, (1867-71) Fed. Case No. 3621a, 7 Fed. Cases 63, 66.
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law can only act by the sanction and under the suspension of the
military power, but I cannot think it becomes justices of the
Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction under such conditions."
Justice Wayne, whose circuit was also partly within the South-
ern states then in rebellion, also concurred in the views expressed
by the Chief Justice.
There are three general conditions under which the relation
between the civil and military authority may be discussed: (A)
military government, (B) martial law, (C) military law.
(A) When a military government replaces the existing sov-
ereign power in invaded or occupied territory the military is
supreme and remains in control until withdrawn by the President
or superseded by civil authorities established by legislative ac-
tion. " The power of the military government is complete dur-
ing the period of the war, limited only by international law.
When peace returns and the occupied territory is not returned
to the former sovereign the military government becomes merely
the agent of the new sovereign civil authority about to be estab-
lished.2 5 During the war, however, the courts are merely the
agents of the military government and in the opinion of the
Supreme Court they are subject to the military power, and their
decisions are under its control, whenever the commanding officer
thinks proper to interfere.26 Upon the restoration of peace the
military government is subject to congressional control and the
relation between the military and civil courts is subject to legis-
lative enactment.
(B) Martial law becomes a necessity when civil authorities
prove unable to control domestic or foreign occupied territory
within a given locality. The sovereign power is not questioned.
Civil authority has, however, disappeared within the area in ques-
tion. Constituted authority is not overthrown by the declaration
of martial law. An existing fact is merely given executive or
legislative recognition. A great calamity such as an earthquake,
flood, or fire may close the civil courts as effectively as an insur-
24 Magoon, Reports on the Law of Civil Government in a Territory
Subject to Military Occupation, p. 17.25See also, in. Santiago v. Nogueras, (1909) 214 U. S. 260, 265, 53L. Ed. 989, 29 S. C. R. 608: "The authority to govern such ceded territory
is found in the laws applicable to conquest and cession. That authority is
the military power, under the control of the President as Commander-
in-Chief."26 Jecker v. Montgomery, (1851) 13 How. (U.S.) 498, 515, 14 L. Ed. 240.
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rection or a riot. All the constitutional and other rights of citi-
zens become for the time being unenforceable. A necessity
therefore exists for prompt and efficient action to restore civil
authority and constitutional rights. Experience has demonstrated
the necessity and wisdom of the use of martial law in such emer-
gencies. Furthermore, the civil branch of the government dis-
placed by disaster, or demonstrated to be incapable of controlling
a mob, should not seek to embarrass the military authority which
is endeavoring to restore order and the rights of citizens who
have looked in vain to the courts for relief.2 7
The United States constitution clearly recognizes the possibil-
ity of a state becoming involved in war.2 8  If actually invaded
by a foreign power, the state has the right to engage in war and
this as a consequence may result in the declaration of martial
law.29 "Unquestionably, a state may use its military power to
put down an armed insurrection too strong to be controlled by the
civil authority. The power is essential to the existence of every
government . . . and if the state required the use of mili-
tary force and the declaration of martial law, we see no ground
upon which this court can question its authority. '3 0
It is sometimes said that the provision of the United States
constitution that states may engage in war when "in such immi-
nent danger as will not admit of delay" refers to -danger from a
foreign force or from Indians. That was undoubtedly the cor-
rect interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Articles of
Confederation. But the wording of the United States consti-
tution amply justifies the construction placed upon it by the court
in Luther v. Borden: "It was a state of war and the established
government resorted to the rights and usages of war." A group
-of insurrectionists in a border state might invite foreign assist-
ance and organize to co-operate with such foreign power. The
real danger might well be from within and not admit of delay.
Surely in such a case a state is authorized to act, even if the strug-
27Wallace, 8 Journtl of Crim. Law and Cr., pp. 167, 406.
28 Art. I Sec. 1P, Cl. 2.
29 But see the dissenting opinion of Justice Woodbury in Luther v.
Borden, supra; and also Willoughby, Const. Law, II, p. 1239: "Indeed, it
may be said that a state of the Union has not the constitutional power to
create, by statute or otherwise, a state of war, or by legislative act or
executive proclamation to suspend, even for the time being, all civil juris-
diction."
30 Luther v. Borden, supra, majority opinion, by Taney, C. J.
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gle develops into actual warfare. Would a state like West Vir-
ginia, threatened by insurrection and sedition, be powerless to
act and dependent upon federal aid only? Such a doctrine would
deprive the states of the right of self-defense. 31 A state may de-
clare martial law in time of insurrection or invasion and such a
crisis may result in war as truly as the Civil War thus developed
within the nation.
Martial law recognizes an emergency during which the mili-
tary is superior to the civil authority. "If the inhabitants of the
state, or a great body of them, should combine to obstruct inter-
state commerce, or the transportation of the mails, prosecution
for such offences had in such a community would be doomed in
advance to failure. ' ' 32 Thus the governor of Idaho, facing a con-
dition of civil incompetency in Shoshone County which had ex-
tended over a period of several years, very properly restored
civil authority by temporarily establishing martial law.33 Like-
wise when the governor of Colorado acted in the crisis which had
arisen in that state as an outgrowth of strikes and disorders he
substituted the military for the powerless civil authority. The
Supreme Court of the United States recognized and approved this
action and declared that "public danger warrants the substitu-
tion of executive process for judicial process. 34
The case of Hatfield v. Graham illustrates the possibilities of
martial law. It was alleged that war and insurrection existed in
Fayette, Kanawha, and Boone counties, that many lives were lost,
much property destroyed, and that the state spent five hundred
thousand dollars in suppressing it. Under these circumstances
the governor alone was the judge of the necessity of declaring
martial law, and the fact that the courts were in session did not
prevent the establishment of martial law within the same area.
In his strong dissenting opinion judge Robinson stated that
the majority opinion denied to the plaintiff the constitutional
right to a judicial determination of the justifiableness or mali-
ciousness of the acts of the military. He also held that it was a
judicial question as to whether the governor had acted within
31 Wallace, 8 Jour. of Crim. Law and Cr. 406.
32 In re Debs, (1895) 158 U. S. 564, 39 L. Ed. 1092, 15 S. C. R. 900.
33 In re Boyle, (1899) 6 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 706.24 Moyer v. Peabody, (1908) 212 U. S. 78, 53 L. Ed. 410, 29 S. C. R.
235.
a5 (1914) 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S. E. 533, Ann. Cas. 1917C 1.
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his political jurisdiction; that the decision of the majority "per-
mits a governor to deal with private rights as he pleases. He
need only answer that he does so officially. . . . Such-a view
is wholly un-American, and inconsistent with constitutional gov-
ernment; reason and authority condemn it; and the administra-
tion of even-handed justice cries out against it.' '38
Yet there seems to be no escape from the conclusion that mar-
tial law becomes a necessity in time of emergency. But the lia-
bility of the military officer or the subordinate after the emer-
gency has passed remains to be considered. Inasmuch as the
standing of the military person before a civil court, in such case,
is the same whether the act in question was committed under mili-
tary law or martial law, this subject is treated under military law
in relation to civil courts.
(C) The relation between civil courts and the military on
questions of military law may well be considered under the fol-
lowing divisions: (a) The military person who seeks relief in the
civil courts from the action of a military tribunal; (b) the mili-
tary person who pleads as his defense before a civil court his
military status or a military order; (c) the military person who
is charged with having violated the civil law and is demanded by
the civil authorities.
(a) Courts-martial are not a part of the judiciary of the
United States. They are created by orders. To convene such
courts and to act upon their proceedings is an attribute of com-
mand. The legal sentence of a court-martial when duly executed,
as by discharge from the army, cannot be "reached by pardon, nor
revoked, recalled, or modified, either by Congress or by the
Executive. '37  If jurisdiction of the subject matter and person
by the military tribunal exist, no court of any state or of the
36 See the address of W. G. Mathews, president of the West Virginia
Bar Association (Proceedings, 1913, p. 16). He not only condemned
the majority opinion of the supreme court in State v. Brown and' the
doctrine sustained by the court in Hatfield v. Graham, but the action of the
governor in preventing a decision by the Supreme Court of the United
States on the issues involved. "By the subsequent pardon of those con-
victed by the military commission and denied relief by our supreme court
their cases cannot be reviewed by the Federal Supreme Court." The dis-
cussion of the above address by the Bar Association appears on pages 58 to
85. The address being referred to a committee, their report adverse to
any action appears in the proceedings for the following year, 1914, pp.
110, 111. It is thus evident that Judge Robinson's dissenting opinion was
approved by many members of the Association.3 7 Dig. of Ops. of the Judge Adv. Gen., 1912, p. 577.
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United States can revise, set aside, or review the judgment of the
military court. "It is not the office of the writ of habeas corpus
to perform the functions of a writ of error in reviewing the
judgmeni of a court-martial . . . There must be jurisdiction
to hear and determine, and to render the particular judgment
and sentence imposed; but, if this exists, however erroneous the
proceedings may be, they cannot be reviewed collaterally, or re-
dressed by habeas corpus. These principles have been repeatedly
declared by the authorities. '3s The decision, therefore, of a mili-
tary tribunal acting "within the scope of its lawful powers
cannot be reviewed or set aside by the civil courts."39
The authority to establish courts-martial and the powers of
such courts are derived from the military powers of Congress and
the Executive Department. "The power is given without any
connection between it and the third article of the constitution de-
fining the judicial power of the United States; indeed, the two
powers are entirely independent of each other . . . If it
were otherwise, the civil courts would virtually administer the
Rules and Articles of War, irrespective of those to whom that
duty and obligation has been confided by the laws of the United
States, from whose decisions no appeal or jurisdiction of any kind
has been given to the civil magistrate or civil courts."40  This
statement is, of course, based upon the assumption that jurisdic-
tion of both subject matter and person was obtained by the court-
martial.
The recent case of Higgins v. Stotesbury4l is in conflict with
this general doctrine of the independence of military tribunals
from judicial review. The court said: "The first charge, on
which the accused was found guilty, is that having received a
lawful command from his superior officer . . . to assist in
the preparation of the muster rolls, did wilfully neglect to com-
ply with such order." The court discovered no evidence what-
eve- of either refusal or neglect, and therefore considered itself
38Rose v. Roberts, (1900) 99 Fed. 948, citing Ex parte Yarborough,
(1884) 110 U. S. 651, 28 L. Ed. 274, 4 S. C. R. 152; United States v.
Pridgeon, (1894) 153 U. S. 48, 59, 38 L. Ed. 631, 14 S. C. R. 746.
39 Johnson v. Sayre, (1895) 158 U. S. 109, 39 L. Ed. 914, 15 S. C. R.
773; Reaves v. Ainsworth, (1911) 219 U. S. 296, 304, 31 S. C. R. 230.
See also, Winthrop, Military Law 55-57; Clode, Military Law 58; Green-
leaf, Evidence 470.4 0 Dynes v. Hoover, (1857) 20 How. (U.S.) 65, 79-82, 15 L. Ed. 838.
41 (1918) 169 N. Y. Supp. 998.
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competent to review and to revise the findings of -the court-mar-
tial.
In Smith v. Hoffman, 2 the only authority cited in Higgins v.
Stotesbury, the court held that a military board of examination is
a judicial body whose determination may be reviewed by a com-
mon law writ of certiorari. The court stated that .there is a con-
flict in the American state authorities on this point.43  But the
only case cited, other than the New York decisions, to sustain the
position of the court was a Tennessee case, where the court,
without any authorities to support it, starts with the assertion,
"All inferior courts are erected by statute . . . and subject
to the superintendence of our circuit courts." 44  The court then
made the assumption that courts-martial are inferior to judicial
courts and reached the natural conclusion that there was a right
of appeal to the civil courts. The fallacy of the above assumption
is evident when the fact is considered that courts-martial are the
creatures of orders; the power to convene them, as well as the
power to act upon the proceedings, being an attribute of com-
mand.4 5  They are merely instrumentalities of the executive
power. Though acting judicially, they are not in any sense judi-
cial bodies.
The New York cases are consistent and sound if one first ac-
cepts the reasoning in Garling v. Van Allen.4" The right to coun-
sel in court-martial proceedings was upheld in this case on the
theory that a military tribunal was a court within the meaning
of the New York constitution. The chief justice commented
upon the "former" extensive powers of courts-martial resulting
in arbitrary decisions condemned by Blackstone: "How much is
it to be regretted that a set of men whose bravery has so often
preserved the liberties of their country, should be reduced to a
state of servitude in the midst of a nation of free men !"' 7  It
42 (1901) 166 N. Y. 462, 476, 60 N. E. 187, 54 L. R. A. 597.43 Encyc. of Pl. & Pr., IV, 40.
44 Durham v. United States, (1817) 4 Hay. (Tenn.) 54, 69.
45 Davis, Military Law, 1915 ed., p. 15.
46 (1873) 55 N. Y. 31.
47 1 Blackstone 416. The New York court in Smith v. Hoffman, 166 N.
Y. 462, 473-74, supra, recognizing the military and civil authorities contrary
to their decision, observed: "The subject, however, is treated with refer-
ence to a standing army rather than the militia of the various states. .
A member of the state militia belongs to civil life, has a civil avocation,
and only occasionally engages in the exercise of arms. A member of
the United States army, on the other hand, has no employment except that
of a soldier, and arms constitute the business of his life. Hence, more
rigid rules and a higher state of discipline are required in one dase than
in the other."
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was the judgment of the court that the powers of courts-martial
had been restricted and limited. How or when they did not in-
dicate. 48 The New York court had previously denied the con-
stitutional right to a jury trial in court-martial proceedings.49
The New York courts have simply followed in the more recent
cases the doctrine as laid down in Garling v. Van Allen. If that
case could be supported as properly stating the doctrine of com-
mon law, which it did not,50 then of course Higgins v. Stotesbury
would be sound law.
Inagmuch as courts-martial merely make findings which have
no effect until approved by the proper superior in command, and
dissolve upon making findings, it is an interesting question as to
whose duty it would be to make a return on certiorari proceed-
ings.5
1
Any decision which purports to uphold the authority of the
civil court to review or revise the findings of the military tribunal
ignores the fact that courts-martial are courts of honor. The
95th Article of War reads: "Any officer or cadet who is con-
victed of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall
be dismissed from the service," and the 96th Article of War pro-
vides: "All disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order
and military discipline, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit
upon the military service" shall be punished at the discretion of
the military tribunal. Thus it is evident that standards of con-
duct unknown to the common law courts are established in the
army. Usages and customs peculiar to army life are a part of
the system. If the civil court attempted to review the findings
of military tribunals it would be incompetent to act, for the sim-
ple reason that it would be compelled to apply a standard of
conduct with which it is unfamiliar and which is inconsistent
with the principles and doctrines of the common law. "In military
life there is a higher code termed honor which holds its society
to stricter accountability, and it is not desirable that the standard
of the army should come down to the requirements of the criminal
code."52
48 Smith v. Hoffman, supra.
49 People v. Daniell, (1872) 50 N. Y. 274.
50 Dynes v. Hoover, supra.
51 Winthrop, Military Law 55.
52 Fletcher v. United States, (1891) 26 Ct. of Cl. 563.
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(b) We have considered the military person who seeks relief
in the civil court from the military tribunal. Let us now consider
the military person who pleads as his defense before a civil court
his military status or the order of a superior officer.
The soldier establishes a new status by his enlistment. But
he cannot and does not discard the obligations, rights, and duties
of citizenship. "The soldier is still a citizen, and as such is
always amenable to the civil authority." 53  In the absence of
statutory provisions he is, in general, subject to the same liability
for his torts, crimes, and contracts as other citizens. 54 This is
true although the action in a civil court be brought by a soldier
against his superior officer. A marine sued his commanding
officer for an alleged illegal flogging inflicted for disciplinary pur-
poses while on shipboard in a foreign port. The officer acted with-
in the scope of his authority, but was declared to be liable if the
punishment which was inflicted was in the opinion of the jury
"in any manner or any degree increased or aggravated by malice
or a vindictive feeling." The Supreme Court fully realized the
necessity for maintaining the security and efficiency of the Navy,
but "at the same time it must be borne in mind that the nation
would be equally dishonored if it permitted the humblest in-
dividual in its service to be oppressed and injured by his com-
manding officer, from malice or ill-will, or the wantonness of
power, without giving him redress in the courts of justice."5 5
It is thus evident that the status of a soldier does not prevent
his seeking relief in the civil courts even against those who are
his superiors in command and for acts which they have done in
the execution of their office.
The more common case arises when the soldier pleads his
military orders as justification in the defense of a civil or criminal
action. Let us first consider the action in tort. In the case of
Bates v. Clark5" the captain and lieutenant in command at Fort
53 State v. Sparks, (1864) 27 Tex. 627, 632.
54 But see Minn. G. S. 1913, Sec. 2379, and similar statutes existing
in many of the states.
1 5 Dinsman v. Wilkes, (1851) 12 How. (U.S.) 390, 402, 405, 13 L. Ed.
1036.
56 (1877) 95 U. S. 204, 24 L. Ed. 471. See also, Clark v. Cumins,
(1868) 47 II. 372. But see dictum. Herlihy v. Donohue, (1916) 52 Mont.
601, 611, 161 Pac. 164, Ann. Cas. 1917C 29. ". . . the inferior military
officer may defend his acts against civil liability by reference to the order
of his superior, unless such order bears upon its face the marks of its
own invalidity or want of authority."
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Seward, acting under the orders of the commanding general of
the Department of Dakota, seized and destroyed liquor which they
had good reason to believe, and which they in good faith did be-
lieve, was in Indian territory, but which under the interpretation
of the Supreme Court was not within Indian territory. Both
officers were held liable for damages as trespassers. Said the
Court: "Whatever may be the rule in time of war, and in the
presence of actual hostilities, military officers can no more pro-
tect themselves than civilians for wrongs committed in time of
peace under orders emanating from a source which is itself
without authority."
It is clearly established that the order of the superior which
is illegal in fact cannot be successfully pleaded as a defense in an
action for damages. If an officer executes an illegal sentence of
court-martial, he is liable for damages.5 7  Chief Justice Marshall
in Wise v. Withers58 observed: "It is a principle that a decision
of such a tribunal in a case clearly without its jurisdiction,-cannot
protect the officer who executes it. The court and the officer
are all trespassers."
In time of actual warfare, when necessity requires such action,
the military commander may seize or destroy private property
and he incurs no personal liability. The burden of proving the
state of actual necessity, however, rests upon the military person
when sued for such an act. Confederate soldiers incurred no
liability for destroying property in line with their military duty.59
Put where Confederate officers, acting under orders, took two
mules and a wagon for the transportation service of the army
they were held liable for damages because "no pressing necessity,
in which they were compelled to act promptly, having no time to
acquire the property according to law," was shown to exist.10
57 But not for punitive damages, if he acts in good faith. Johnson
v. Jones, (1867) 44 Ill. 142.58 (1806) 3 Cranch (U. S.) 331, 2 L. Ed. 457; Milligan v. Hovey, (1871)
3 Biss. (U.S.C.C.) 13; Barrett v. Crane, (1844) 16 Vt. 246; Mills v.
Martin, (1821) 19 John, (N.Y.) 7; Duffield v. Smith, (1818) 3 Serg. &R. (Pa.) 590. But see Shoemaker v. Nesbit, (1828) 2 Rawle (Pa.)
201; and Savacool v. Boughton, (1830) 5 Wend. (N.Y.) 170, 180. The
soundness of Wise v. Withers was questioned and it was held that if the
court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, but not the person of the ac-
cused, and its proceedings were in regular course of law, a ministerial
officer who executes the sentence will be protected.
59 Freeland v. Williams, (1889) 131 U. S. 405, 33 L. Ed. 193, 9 S.
C. R. 763.
60 Bryan v. Walker, (1870) 64 N. C. 141; Mitchell v. Harmony, (1851)
13 How. (U.S.) 115, 14 L. Ed. 75.
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There has been considerable conflict in the decisions of Ameri-
can courts upon the criminal liability of a soldier who acts in good
faith in obedience to the orders of a superior officer, which are
apparently valid. It has been held that "the order of a superior
will be full protection in a criminal prosecution unless the illegal-
ity of the order is so clearly shown on its face that a man of
ordinary sense and understanding would know it was illegal." '
Clark and Marshall state the rule as follows : "An order given
by an officer to his private, which does not expressly and clearly
show on its face its own illegality, the soldier is liound to obey and
such order is his full protection." 2  On the other hand, Bishop
takes the extreme position that "the command of a superior to
an inferior-as, of a military officer to a subordinate, or of a par-
ent to a child-will not justify a criminal act done in pursuance
of it; . . . the person doing the wrongful thing is guilty, the
same as though he had proceeded self-moved."6 3  Hence the
position of a soldier may be, both in theory and practice, a diffi-
cult one. He may, as it has well been said, be liable to be shot
by a court-martial if he disobeys an order, and be hanged by a
judge and jury if he obeys it."4
What, then, is the legal duty of the soldier? Dicey says: "The
matter is one which has never been absolutely decided."'6 5 A sol-
dier cannot, in all cases, be held to blind obedience to superior
orders. Such a doctrine would destroy the very discipline of
the army which it seeks to protect. "It would justify the private
in shooting his colonel by the orders of the captain, or in deserting
to the enemy on the field of battle by order of his immediate
superior."6 6 Unless the soldier is bound to disobey or justified
in disobeying any order, it would appear that the correct rule is
that the soldier must obey, "except in a plain case of excess of
authority, where, at first blush, it is apparent and palpable to the
61Re Fair, (1900) 100 Fed. 149. See also United States v. Clark,
(1887) 31 Fed. 710, 717: "Unless the act was manifestly beyond the scope
of his authority, or . . . was such that a man of ordinary sense and
understanding would know that it was illegal, it would be a protection
to him if he acted in good faith and without malice."
62Law of Crimes, 2nd ed., Sec. 83.
63 New Criminal Law, 8th ed., Vol. 1 Sec. 355. And see Rex v.
Thomas, (1815) 4 Maule & Selwyn 442.64 Dicey, Law of thi Constitution, 4th ed., p. 282.
65 Dicey, Law of the Constitution 283.
66 Stephen, History of Criminal Law of England, I, p. 205.
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commonest understanding that the order is illegal."6 7 This rule is
objected to as too indefinite. Military orders are frequently
communicated orally. They are very difficult to prove in their
exact form. It may be almost impossible to prove that the
subordinate received the order in the exact form which is necess-
ary for his defense.6
The illegal orders of a superior officer can never justify the
destruction of property or injury to the person in a civil action
for damages. 6 9 But an illegal order of a superior "may excuse
subordinates who are honestly and reasonably misled thereby,"
in a criminal action70
(c) An enlisted man, or officer, may be punished by civil
authority for violating any law of the land, including a municipal
ordinance. It is the duty of the military to deliver over such
accused soldier to the civil authority "upon application duly
made," except in time of war, or when the person demanded is
under court-martial charges "awaiting trial or results of trial,
or who is undergoing sentence." 71 When the military jurisdic-
tion has actually attached in the manner stated, the commanding
officer may in his discretion deliver the accused soldier to the
civil authority. It is, of course, his duty to deliver the accused
soldier to the civil authority if court-martial proceedings have
not yet begun. The utmost endeavor of the commanding officer
to apprehend and secure the accused is required under the
Articles of War. Even in time of actual warfare the command-
ing officer in the absence of special orders may deliver the ac-
cused to the civil authority. If the person desired is already
undergoing sentence of court-martial, he may be delivered for
trial and if convicted the civil sentence merely interrupts the
execution of the military sentence, which must be completed
when he is returned to the military jurisdiction.
67 "Unless the order is plainly illegal, the disobedience of it is punish-
able under the general article, i. e., the 96th Article. To justify from
a military point of view a military inferior in disobeying an order
of a superior, the order must be one requiring something to be done whichis palpably a breach of law and a crime or an injury to a third person, oris of a serious character (not involving unimportant consequences only)
and if done would not be susceptible of being righted." Manual forCourts-Martial, United States Army, 1917, p. 210.68 Brown, 8 Jour. of Crim. Law and Cr. 190, 205.
69 5 Corpus Juris 366.70 Ballentine, Proposed Military Code, 14 Mich. Law Rev. 213
71 74th Article of War.
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This entire question has been modified by the new section
in the Articles of War (117):
"When any civil suit or criminal prosecution is commenced
in any court of a state against any officer, soldier, or other
person in the military service of the United States on account
of any act done under color of his office or status . . . such
suit or prosecution may at any time before the trial or final hear-
ing thereof be removed for trial into the district court of the
United States."
This act does not affect those cases in which no claim of de-
fense is made on account of the military status of the accused. It
does, however, provide a means of preventing the state courts
from deciding whether the accused was acting properly in the
execution of his office.
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